"Although some observers may believe that Putin would fold before he approaches the nuclear threshold, and others worry that even the smallest NATO action will inevitably spark World War III, such arguments at both extremes ignore the role of chance and risk. A nuclear crisis is not an orderly duel or a game with rules, but rather a maelstrom of poor information, conflicting signals, and highly charged emotions. To make matters worse, Putin has always been a poor strategist, a risk-taker who foolishly sets in motion—as he has done in Ukraine—forces he cannot control.
"In any case, even if Putin is too deluded to think about such risks, the rest of us must consider the dangers of ordering the largest military coalition in human history into battle against a disorganized and battered army led by incompetent officers and commanded by an isolated and delusional president. Putting so many military assets in play, with combat breaking out all over Europe, could spark a catastrophe that neither we nor Putin intended. The danger is not that the Russian war on Ukraine becomes a replay of 1939, in which a coalition must stop a mad dictator at all costs, but that a Russia-NATO war becomes a nuclear version of 1914, in which all the combatants would find themselves moving from a crisis none of them expected into a cataclysm none of them wanted." -- Tom Nichols in The Atlantic writing on how "Only NATO Can Save Putin." The main point of Nichols' article is that war criminal Putin, in his desperation, will try to goad NATO into direct conflict with Russia in order to shore up support at home. It's an interesting and compelling case that argues for not playing by Putin's rules while increasing the pressure on Russia by continuing to supply Ukraine with offensive and defensive weapons, tightening the noose around the Russian economy, shoring up NATO defenses, and opening NATO membership to Sweden and Finland if they wish to join. But, Nichols argues, don't give Putin what he most wants -- a war with NATO.
